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Party Positions on the European 
Constitution During the 2004 
European Parliament Elections  
 






The salience assigned to the European Constitution and the positions on it taken by national parties 
during the 2004 European Parliament elections are the focus of this paper. To explore these issues, we 
use party manifestos, expert data on party positions, and public opinion survey data from 
Eurobarometer. Through content analysis of the manifestos we find that the Constitution has been 
politicised and contested. In countries where the issue has been put in the spotlight by one or more 
parties, other parties also have had to take a position. The positions parties have taken on the 
Constitution are related to their overall position on European integration, whether or not they 





THE PROCESS OF DEEPENING AND WIDENING THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) CAN BE 
expected to alter contestation among political parties in the member states. Political 
competition between parties during elections might no longer be fully insulated from 
the issues battled out at the EU level. Instead, parties could seek to better position 
themselves relative to their competitors by invoking broader European issues. Such an 
impact might especially be expected after episodes of intensive deliberations or Treaty 
negotiations at the EU level, such as the recent efforts to draft a constitutional treaty. 
The ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ (Constitutional Convention) not only 
discussed sensitive issues, but also, due to its innovative working method, gave 
national and European party actors an unprecedented opportunity to participate 
actively in EU-level deliberations.  
 
Studying national party positions regarding the EU Constitution is important for 
helping us to understand party attitudes toward the EU more generally. A further 
recent concern in the literature is how European integration affects party competition. 
This paper contributes to these debates by considering the positions on the 
Constitution taken by parties during the 2004 European Parliament (EP) elections. Our 
central research question is how, if at all, the constitutional discussions affected 
political contestation in those elections. More specifically, did parties politicise the 
constitutional issue during the election campaign and take clearly discernible positions 
along partisan lines? In order to answer this question, our research focuses on the 
salience parties assigned to and positions they took on the Constitution. 
 
Our research consists of content analysis of references to the Constitution in 
manifestos issued for the June 2004 EP elections. Additionally, this paper uses the 
expert opinions in the 2002 Chapel Hill dataset (Hooghe 2009) and the expert data 
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integration, their degree of internal division on the issue, and where they stand on a 
left/right scale. Further, to assess the potential influence of public opinion on the 
salience parties assign to the Constitution, we use survey data from Eurobarometer 
61.0, conducted in spring 2004. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: in the following section we discuss briefly the nature 
of party competition in multi-level settings and relate this to party positions on the 
Constitution, in order to arrive at testable propositions. In the third section we describe 
the data used for the empirical exploration of our hypotheses. In the fourth section we 
present the empirical findings and draw out the implications of our results for the 




Understanding Party Competition through Salience Theory and Cleavage Theory 
 
The literature on the impact of European integration on national party systems arrives 
at contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, there are scholars who view national 
party systems as impervious to the influence of European issues; they argue that there 
is no dimension of party competition focused on Europe. Instead, national political 
elites collude to depoliticise European issues (Mair 2001 and 2007). Further, EP elections 
are seen merely as second-order elections (Franklin et al. 1994; Irwin 1995; Reif and 
Schmitt 1980). National political parties do not compete for votes using a European 
based platform, but rather by a selection of national issues guided by short-term 
considerations, such as challenging the performance of the incumbent government. 
 
On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that Europe is becoming a more 
salient issue in political discussions. These scholars have found a remarkable degree of 
coherence in the way parties with a similar ideological position accommodate 
European issues in their election campaigns (Gabel and Hix 2002; Marks et al. 2002; 
Pennings 2002). Their work suggests that support for European integration partly 
overlaps with the partisan structuring of the left/right axis and in fact can be seen as an 
inverted U-curve (Hooghe et al. 2004: 129). Additionally, the argument has been made 
that those aspects of European integration that cannot easily be incorporated into the 
left/right axis emerge as a distinct pro-/anti-integration dimension (Marks and 
Steenbergen 2004). In this dimension, parties take clearly discernible and predictable 
positions. Furthermore, analysis of roll-call votes indicates that, due to high levels of 
political group cohesion, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are more prone 
to vote according to ideology than to nationality (Attina 1990; Hix 1999 and 2001; Hix et 
al. 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999).  
 
It has been shown that differences in the degree to which parties of left and right 
support European integration are largest at the disaggregated level of issues. EU 
policies related to political regulation of the market, such as cohesion policy, and policies 
with distributional effects, such as social, employment, environmental and trade 
policies, are most closely connected to the left/right dimension (Marks and 
Steenbergen 2004). 
 
Hooghe and Marks have argued that since the early 1990s there has been a 
constraining dissensus on European issues, replacing the permissive consensus of the 
previous phase of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Elite decisions 
about European issues can now engage mass publics, in particular when national 
identity or authority is at stake. European constitution-making is relevant to partisan 
politics, including in the context of the 2004 EP elections. The Constitution is contested 
at the national level since not all parties support increasing European integration and 
some want to halt it. Whether or not an issue becomes politicised depends on whether 
one or more parties take it up. As European integration has grown in scope and depth, 
it has proven ripe for politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2009). If the Constitution is 
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conceived of as a major symbol and result of increasing European integration, studying 
how it is handled by national parties during the 2004 EP elections can enable us to 
determine to what extent European integration has affected national party 
competition.  
 
Our main objective in this paper is to analyse the degree to which the recent 
constitution-building process at the EU level influenced political competition during 
the 2004 EP elections. By this we aim to contribute to the literature examining the 
impact of European integration on national party systems. To this end, we specify a 
number of propositions regarding salience (derived from salience theory) and position-
taking (derived from cleavage theory) since both are indicators of the degree to which 
political parties polarised on the Constitution. 
 
EP election campaigns focus mainly on national issues, and voters in EP elections are 
motivated by national-level criteria and not by European issues (Van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1996). This second-order nature of EP elections affects the way in which parties 
discuss the Constitution in manifestos, that is, in dealing with it they will take into 
account the national political context, and, in particular, party competition. For this 
reason, we focus on the degree to which the salience that each party assigns to the 
constitutional issue is affected by the salience that other parties in the party system 
assigned to it. 
 
Salience theory predicts that during election campaigns parties emphasise the types of 
issues that favour themselves, in order to accomplish certain goals, such as electoral 
success or maintaining party cohesion (Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 1994; Riker 1982; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Conversely, parties 
devote considerably less attention to those issues that they believe might work in 
favour of competing parties or party groups. Parties seek to avoid a direct 
confrontation of opposing policies. Instead, they will selectively emphasise the strong 
points of their own case (Budge and Farlie 1983: 24). In doing so, certain types of parties 
have become widely perceived as ‘owning’ certain issue types, for example, the welfare 
state, law and order, the environment, religion. Electors are expected to vote for the 
party that puts most emphasis on the issues important to them. Recent research has 
shown that parties have been inclined to de-emphasise the European integration issue 
in their manifestos (Pennings 2006; Poguntke et al. 2007). However, parties that oppose 
the Constitution might have a strong incentive to put this issue on the agenda if they 
hope to benefit electorally from a disequilibrium in the political system caused by them 
introducing this issue. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the tactical choice a party makes whether to 
emphasise or de-emphasise the Constitution is not made in a vacuum. We expect to 
find that it would be related to the choices made by competing parties. As 
Steenbergen and Scott point out, “the salience of an issue is determined by many 
factors, not least of which is the behaviour of other parties. A party can ignore those 
factors only at the risk of removing itself from the mainstream political debate” (2004: 
169). Thus, the more that one party emphasises the Constitution as an issue, the more it 
creates pressure on other parties in the same political system to do the same. This 
might imply that the salience of a particular topic for a given party is determined more 
by the salience of that topic for competing parties than by its own preferences. In that 
sense, the tactical choice of each party is related to the sum of the choices made by 
parties in the same political system. Therefore, we will examine to what extent the 
salience assigned to the Constitution by the parties collectively in a given country is 
related to the salience assigned to it by parties individually.  
 
Cleavage theory identifies the ideological location of a party as a powerful predictor of 
the position it will take on European integration in general and the EU Constitution in 
particular. Ideological positions constrain the way parties respond to new issues and 
new challenges. It is commonly assumed that the left/right divide is the main factor 
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structuring the positions parties take during competition (Marks and Wilson 2000; 
Hooghe et al. 2004). Both the concern to preserve the loyalty of established 
constituencies, and the legacy of past agendas limit the range of possible responses 
parties have to new issues.  
 
Issues concerning European integration have been shown to be cross-cutting, capable 
of causing dissent within parties and party families (Thomassen et al. 2004). An 
imbalance in the degree to which economic and political integration are favoured can 
fuel intra-party dissent. Some parties are more vulnerable to internal dissent than 
others. Examples are conservative parties that favour economic integration rather than 
political integration, and socialist parties in countries with a traditionally strong social 
democracy that favour political integration rather than economic integration 
(Steenbergen and Scott 2004). 
 
Marks and Hooghe have demonstrated that the relationship between left/right and 
European integration is shaped as an inverted U-curve. This shape of the distribution is 
due to three factors: first, extreme left and extreme right parties at either end of the 
ideological spectrum show very low levels of support for European integration; second, 
centre-left parties have become increasingly inclined to support a European regulatory 
system, while centre-right parties continue to fear the erosion of national decision-
making prerogatives; third, centrist parties (i.e. social democratic, Christian democratic, 
liberal, and conservative parties) generally show high levels of support for European 
integration (Hooghe et al. 2004: 129). Clearly discernible left/right stances coincide 
strongly with pro- and anti-EU positions, especially in the case of socio-economic policy 
areas. For example, left parties will favour more EU involvement in the areas of 
employment, social policies, etc., and right parties will oppose such a course (Marks and 
Steenbergen 2004).  
 
The Constitutional Convention took place from February 28, 2002 to July 10, 2003 and 
addressed substantial EU institutional and constitutional matters that were considered 
to have been left over from previous rounds of Treaty reform. In December 2001, the 
European Council in Laeken laid out not only the procedural details of when it should 
convene and how it should be constituted, but also the goals and the objectives of 
such a Convention. According to the Laeken Declaration, the Convention should tackle 
a wide range of issues: the division of competences between the Union and its member 
states; how to simplify the Union's legislative instruments; how to maintain inter-
institutional balance; how to make decision-making more effective; the definition of 
the EU’s role in an increasingly global environment; and the constitutionalisation of the 
Treaties. These issues clearly pointed to a change to the status quo and thus required 
national parties to take a position which might differ from their accustomed attitude 
toward European integration. 
 
During the Convention, out of all the delegates and observers from the member states 
and the acceding countries, only 66 had the right to vote, that is, one governmental 
and two parliamentary representatives from each member state (König and Hug 2006). 
In most cases, these representatives were members of established parties that often 
participated in government. The absence of many extremist and new parties during the 
Convention helped the process of consensus building. A large majority of the 
delegates was pro-Europe and in favour of the Constitution. During the referenda held 
on the Constitution, particularly in France and the Netherlands, some of the parties that 
had not participated in the Convention actively and successfully mobilised voters to 
vote against it (Crum 2007; Pennings and Arnold 2008). 
  
 
Data, Method and Measurement 
 
In order to measure the salience of the Constitution for parties, and the position they 
took on it during the 2004 EP elections, we collected national party manifestos issued 
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for this election.  We selected parties that won at least one seat in the current 
Parliament. This selection criterion gave a total of 100 manifestos. Table 1 lists the 
parties included. 
 
Table 1: List of Parties 
 
Country Party Label Party Name Party Name Translated 
Sweden (SE)    
 junilistan Junilistan The June List 
 MP Miljöpartiet de Gröna The Environmental Party 




Workers’ Party-Social  
Democrats 
 FP Folkpartiet Liberalerna People’s Party Liberals 
 KD Kristdemokraterna Christian Democrats 
 M Moderata Samlingspartiet Moderate Rally Party 
 C Centerpartiet Centre Party 
Denmark (DK)    
 FolkB Folkebevægelsen Popular Movement 
 JuniB JuniBevægelsen June Movement 
 SF Socialistisk Folkeparti Socialist People’s Party 
 SD 
Socialdemokratiet i  
Danmark Social Democracy Party in Denmark 
 RV Radikale Venstre 
Radical Left-Social  
Liberal Party 
 V 
Venstre, Danmarks  
liberale parti 
Left, Liberal Party  
of Denmark 
 KF Konservative Folkeparti Conservative People’s Party 
 DF Dansk Folkeparti Danish People’s Party 
Finland (FI)    




Social Democratic  
Party of  
Finland 
 KOK Kansallinen Kokoomus National Rally 
 KESK Suomen Keskusta Finnish Centre 
 SFP 
Svenska Folkpartiet  
i Finland 
Swedish People’s  
Party 
Netherlands (NL)    
 CU/SGP 
Christen Unie -  
Staatkundig  
Gereformeerde Partij 
Christian Union -  
Political Reformed  
Party 
 EurTrans Europa Transparant Europe Transparent 
 Groen Links Groen Links Green Left 
 SP Socialistische Partij Socialist Party 
 PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party 
 D66 Democraten 66 Democrats 66 
 VVD 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid  
en Democratie 
People’s Party for Freedom  
and Democracy 
 CDA Christen Democratisch Appel Christian Democratic Appeal 
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Country Party Label Party Name Party Name Translated 
Belgium (BE)    
 N-VA Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie New Flemish Alliance 
 MR Mouvement Réformateur Reformist Movement 
 CDH Centre Démocrate Humaniste 
Christian Social  
Party 
 CSP Christlich Soziale Partei Christian Social Party 
 ECOLO Ecolo Ecologists 
 GROEN Agalev Ecologists 
 SPA-SPIRIT Sociaal Progressief Alternatief 
Socialist Party  
(Flemish) 
 PS Parti Socialiste Socialist Party (Walloon) 
 VLD-VIVANT 
Vlaamse Liberalen en 
Democraten Flemish Liberals and Democrats 
 CD&V-N-VA Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams 
Christian People’s  
Party 
 VLAAMS BLOK Vlaams Blok Flemish Block 
 UMP 
Rassemblement pour la 
République 
Rally for the  
Republic 
 FN Front National National Front 
Italy (IT)    
 Fed Verdi Federazione dei Verdi Federation of Greens 
 PIETRO Lista di Pietro - Italia dei Valori List di Pietro Parties - Italy of Values 
 LBONINO Lista Pannella Bonino List Pannella Bonino 
 Pensionati Partito Pensionati Pensioners’ Party 
 NPSI Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano 
New Italian  
Socialist Party 
 PdCI Partito dei Comunisti Italiani 
Party of the Italian  
Communists 
 UDC 
l’Unione dei Democratici 
Cristiani e Democratici  
e di Centro 
Union of Christian  
and Centre Democrats 
 
 UDEUR-AP Unione Democratici per l’Europa 
Union of Democrats 
for Europe 
 RC Rifondazione Comunista Communist Refoundation 
 DS/ULIVIO Democratici di Sinistra Democrats of the Left 
 FI Forza Italia Forwards Italy 
 AN Alleanza Nazionale National Alliance 
 LN Lega Nord Northern League 
Spain (ES)    
 PP Partido Popular People’s Party 
Greece (GR)    
 PASOK Panellino Socialistiko Kinima Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement 
 ND Nea Dimokratia New Democracy 
Portugal (PT)    
 PCP Partido Comunista Português Portuguese Communist Party 
 CDU Coligação Democrática Unitária Unitarian Democratic Coalition 
 PS Partido Socialista Socialist Party 
 PSD Partido Social Democrata Social Democratic Party 
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Country Party Label Party Name Party Name Translated 
Germany (DE)    
 
Buendis/ 
Gruene Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Alliance 90/The Greens 
 PDS 
Partei des Demokratischen  
Sozialismus 
Party of Democratic  
Socialism 
 SPD 
Socialdemokratische Partei  
Deutschlands 
Social Democratic Party  
of Germany 
 FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democratic Party 
 CDU Christlich-Demokratische Union Christian-Democratic Union 
Austria (AT)    
 Gruene Die Grünen The Greens 
 SPO 
Sozialdemokratische Partei  
Österreichs 
Social Democratic Party  
of Austria 
 FPO Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Freedom Party of Austria 
 OVP Österreichische Volkspartei Austrian People’s Party 
United Kingdom 
(GB)    
 Greens Green Party Green Party 
 CYMRU Plaid Cymru The Party of Wales 
 UKIP UK Independence Party UK Independence Party 
 UUP Ulster Unionist Party Ulster Unionist Party 
 LAB Labour Party Labour Party 
 LD Liberal Democrats Liberal Democrats 
 Cons Conservative Party Conservative Party 
 SNP Scottish National Party Scottish National Party 
Ireland (IE)    
 FG Fine Gael Family of the Irish 
 FF Fianna Fáil Soldiers of Destiny 
 SF Sinn Féin We Ourselves 
 
 
After translation, the manifestos were manually coded using a detailed coding scheme.1 
Each sentence was assigned to a pre-defined category, based on the expert 
questionnaire developed for the measurement of positions on the Constitution in the 
EU-funded DOSEI project.2 Finally, all codes were aggregated and normalised against 
                                                 
1 The manifestos were machine-translated using software for each language that produces the best 
results (for example the Systran Software in the cases of Spanish, Italian, German, French and 
Portuguese). Although the translations were often grammatically not quite correct, the meaning of 
the text was clear and manual coding was possible. The use of manual and computer-aided content 
analysis in the social sciences has a long tradition and has been applied to a range of subfields and 
research questions (Bara 2001; Laver and Garry 2000; Laver 2001; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; 
Pennings and Keman 2002; Gabel and Hix 2002; Hix 1999). 
2 The DOSEI group studied the constitution building process from the Laeken convention until the 
ratification in all Member States. Thomas König coordinated the work of 20 political scientists from 
eight European and US universities. The project received funding from the Commission’s 5th 
Framework Programme. For more details on the DOSEI project see König and Hug (2006) and Tsebelis 
(2005). Among the different methodological approaches in content analysis, the following two are 
most often referred to: the wordscoring technique (Laver et al. 2003; Benoit et al. 2005) and the 
dictionary based technique (Pennings and Keman 2002; Pennings and Arnold 2008; and Pennings et 
al. 2004). 
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the length of the document, allowing us to take into account the variable length of all 
the documents. 
 
We have two dependent variables in our analysis: salience of the Constitution; and 
party position on the Constitution. We operationalise salience of the Constitution as 
the total number of sentences, both positive and negative, about the Constitution as a 
proportion of the total sentences in a manifesto. We operationalise party position on 
the Constitution as the proportion of positive to negative sentences about the 
Constitution. 
 
We provide an hypothesis which states that the salience of the Constitution to an 
individual party is related to the collective salience among all the other parties, the so-
called systemic salience. Systemic salience is measured as the mean of the salience 
score of all parties in a given system, after excluding the party under consideration 
(Steenbergen and Scott 2004: 173). For example, given a country with three parties, A, 
B, and C, the systemic salience with respect to party A is defined as the mean salience 
level of parties B and C. This measure is reported in preference to average national 
salience, in order to avoid endogeneity problems. Additionally, we examine whether 
variation in salience across countries and party systems is related to differences in 
public support for or polarisation in attitudes toward European integration. For this 
analysis we use Eurobarometer survey 61.0 which was conducted in spring 2004. In 
particular, we make use of the question that asked respondents whether they were for 
or against the Constitution. 
 
We use the expert opinions in the Chapel Hill dataset (Hooghe et al. 2002) to test 
whether party position on the Constitution is related to internal divisions on European 
integration, the overall position of a party on European integration, or the left/right 
stance of a party. We supplement the Chapel Hill dataset with the expert data from 
Benoit and Laver (2006), since not all relevant countries and parties are covered in the 
Chapel Hill dataset.3 The Chapel Hill 2002 expert survey on party positioning on 
European integration covers 171 parties in 23 of the 25 current EU member states (not 
Luxembourg and Estonia) as well as in Bulgaria and Romania. From these countries we 
select those member states that belonged to the EU prior to 1 May 2004. The survey 
was administered between September 2002 and April 2003 to 636 academics 
specialising in parties or European integration. The survey includes a question about 
internal dissent or conflict in the party concerning European integration.4  Additionally, 
the survey includes a question about a party’s general position on European 
integration.5   The survey also includes a question about a party’s  ideological stance in 
2002 on economic issues (role of government in the economy).6  
 
                                                 
3 K. Benoit, M. Laver (2009) Party Policy In Modern Democracies. Expert Survey Results from 47 
Countries, 2003-2004, available at: http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ppmd/, last accessed 9 April 
2009. From this expert survey we use question 13 which has the following wording: “Please locate 
each party on a general left-right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account.” The 
possible answers range from 1 (Left) to 20 (Right). 
4 This is question 12 in the Chapel Hill expert survey. The wording of this question is: “How much 
internal dissent has there been in the various parties in [COUNTRY] over European integration over 
the course of 2002?” The possible answers range from 1 “party is completely united” to 10 “party is 
extremely divided.” 
5 This is question 1 in the Chapel Hill expert survey. The wording of this question is: “How would you 
describe the general position on European integration that the party’s leadership has taken over the 
course of 2002?” Possible answers to this question range from 1 “strongly opposed to European 
integration” to 7 “strongly in favour of European integration.” 
6 This is question 15 in the Chapel Hill expert survey. The wording of this question is: “Political 
scientists often classify parties in terms of their ideological stance on economic issues. Parties to the 
right emphasize a reduced economic role for government. They want privatization, lower taxes, less 
regulation, reduced government spending, and a leaner welfare state. Parties to the left want 
government to play an active role in the economy. Using these criteria, indicate where parties are 
located in terms of their economic ideology.” 0 indicates that a party is at the extreme left of the 
ideological spectrum, 10 that it is at the extreme right, and 5 that it is at the centre. 
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In total we examine six hypotheses relating to salience of and party position on the 
Constitution. These propositions are derived from the earlier discussion about salience 
theory and cleavage theory. Two hypotheses refer to salience and four to party 
position.  
 
Concerning salience of the Constitution we start from the proposition that the more 
that other parties in the political system emphasise the Constitution as an issue, the 
higher the salience of the Constitution to a party (Hypothesis 1). This hypothesis tests 
the relationship between systemic salience and the salience that each party assigns to 
the Constitution. One might speculate that national salience of the Constitution is also 
related to polarisation in public attitudes toward the Constitution. To determine this, 
we test whether there is a relationship between the salience that all parties in a country 
assign to the Constitution and the degree to which public opinion is polarised on the 
issue. Specifically, we examine whether it is true that the more a country’s public is 
polarised over the Constitution, the more that country’s parties will assign salience to 
this topic (Hypothesis 2). 
 
Concerning party position on the Constitution, the following hypotheses are 
formulated: first, the more a party is located at the extreme end of the ideological 
spectrum, the less likely that it will be in favour of the Constitution (Hypothesis 3). 
Second, the greater a party’s internal divisions over European integration, the less likely 
that it will be in favour of the Constitution (Hypothesis 4). Internal division over Europe 
might deter a party from taking a bold stance on the Constitution. Third, the more that 
a party has a positive attitude toward the EU, the more likely that it will also take a 
positive position on the Constitution (Hypothesis 5). Fourth, parties that participated in 
the Constitutional Convention are more likely to take a positive position on the 
Constitution (Hypothesis 6). Participation in the Constitutional Convention can be 
expected to have an impact on the position that a party is likely to take on the 
Constitution (Pennings and Arnold 2008; Collignon 2003).7 Given the difference 
between the experience of the parties that participated in the Convention (‘insiders’) 
and the parties that did not participate (‘outsiders’) we expect to find variance in the 





In this section the empirical analysis assesses the extent to which the salience that 
parties assign to the Constitution can be explained by the political environment in 
which they operate and also to what extent it is related to national public opinion on 
the Constitution. This section also analyses the extent to which the positions that 
parties take on the Constitution is related to their left/right stance, internal party 
divisions over the issue, their overall position on European integration, and whether or 
not they participated in the Constitutional Convention. The analysis proceeds in two 
steps. First, we analyse the salience of the Constitution. In addition, we examine 
whether the variation in issue salience is related to public opinion. Second, we analyse 
party positions on the Constitution. We use a set of descriptive statistics (scatterplot, 
arithmetic mean and standard deviation) to examine which of our six hypotheses can 
be confirmed. 
                                                 
7 ‘Insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are identified by means of a list of all parties participating in the 
Constitutional Convention. Parties on the list are coded as ‘insiders’ and parties not on the list as 
‘outsiders’. 
8 On the Constitution see Crum 2005; Dinan 2004; Kiljunen 2004; Kokott and Rüth 2003; Schmitter 
2000; Shaw 2003; Norman 2003; and Nugent 2006. This paper focuses on parties which belong to 
member states who had joined the EU prior to 1 May 2004. The manifestos of the new member states 
were not used in this paper, since we are interested in the impact that participation in the 
Constitutional Convention had on the position a party took on the Constitution. The individuals of 
parties of the new member states were only observers in the Convention and therefore had a rather 
different status to the individuals of parties of the old member states. 
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Explaining the Salience of the Constitution 
 
One of the questions we ask in this paper is: When national parties assign salience to 
the Constitution, is this related to the salience that the other parties of the same 
political system have assigned to the Constitution? In other words, is the salience for 
one party affected by the systemic salience (Hypothesis 1)? We define the degree of 
disparity of a party as the absolute value of the difference between the salience 
assigned by that party and the systemic salience with respect to the same party. In 
graph (1) a simple comparison of the national salience (i.e. the average of all the party 
saliences) and the mean disparity (i.e. the average of all the party disparities) 
demonstrates that, at the national level, there is a strong negative correlation.  
 
 
































Source: Own calculations based on content analysis of party manifestos 
 
 
This graph largely confirms Hypothesis 1 which states that if some parties in a country 
assign salience to the Constitution, then the other parties are also likely to be drawn 
into debating the issue and assigning salience. The trendline in the scatterplot 
indicates a negative relationship in the sense that when the national salience is low, the 
disparity is mostly high, e.g., Luxembourg and Portugal, whereas when the national 
salience is high, the mean disparity tends to be very low, e.g., Spain. In the cases of 
Luxembourg and Portugal, we find that there are parties that deviate considerably from 
the national salience either by emphasising the Constitution issue considerably more 
than the other parties or by mentioning the issue much less. Conversely, in the case of 
Spain, where national salience is high and mean disparity is low, we find that parties 
assign about the same, relatively high, salience to the topic. The remaining countries 
cluster in the middle of the scatterplot. On a descriptive level, this indicates that 
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. The salience of the Constitution for a party is indeed related 
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to the salience that the other parties have assigned to the issue. The more that other 
parties in the political system emphasise the Constitution as an issue, the higher the 
salience of the Constitution for a party. 
 
The results of a simple regression also indicate that national salience and mean 
disparity are related. The regression has a fair fit (R-square adjusted = 27%), but, more 
important, the overall relationship is statistically significant (F1,13 = 4.89, t13 = -2.2, p < 
0.05). Mean disparity scores are negatively related to national salience, decreasing by 
0.52 for every unit increase in national salience. This analysis confirms the hypothesis 
that the salience a party assigns to the Constitution is indeed influenced by the salience 
that other parties of the same political system have assigned to the issue. The negative 
coefficients indicate that as national salience increases, the mean disparity among the 
parties in a given system decreases. In other words, when some parties in the political 
system emphasise the Constitution as an issue, other parties in the same political 
system are very likely to put about the same amount of emphasis on it. This finding 
implies that the Constitution is an issue that no party can easily ignore, unless most 
parties neglect it. 
 
One might speculate that national salience of the Constitution is related to polarisation 
in public attitudes toward the Constitution, with national salience increasing the more 
that a country’s population is polarised over the issue. In other words, perhaps there 
could be a relationship between the salience all parties in a country attribute to the 
Constitution and the degree to which public opinion is polarized over the issue. One 
would expect to find that the more a country’s public is polarized over the issue, the 
more national salience should increase (Hypothesis 2).9 In our study, polarisation is 
measured using the Eurobarometer question about the Constitution.10 In graph (2) a 
comparison of the heterogeneity of public opinion on the Constitution and national 
salience (i.e. the average of all of the party saliences on the Constitution) demonstrates 
what appears to be a positive correlation.  
 
Countries with low heterogeneity of public opinion, e.g., Luxembourg and Italy, tend to 
have low national salience as well. Conversely, countries with high heterogeneity of 
public opinion, e.g., Denmark, show high national salience. The results of a simple 
regression indicate that heterogeneity of public opinion and national salience are 
related. The regression has a fair fit (R-square adjusted = 25%) and the overall 
relationship is statistically significant (F1,13 = 7.21, t13 = 2.08, p < 0.05). This analysis 
confirms Hypothesis 2, which states that the salience parties assign to the Constitution 






                                                 
9 To operationalise polarisation over an issue we use the ‘variance’ of public opinion across answer 
categories in the Eurobarometer survey question. We use an indicator of heterogeneity based on 
Lieberson (1969) and elaborated in Sullivan (1973) and Anderson (2005), reflecting the level of 
consensus in domestic public opinion. The indicator, to be called “Heterogeneity of Public Opinion” in 


















where Aw denotes diversity within a population, Yk is the proportion of the population falling in a 
given category within each of the variables, V is the number of variables, and p represents the total 
number of categories within all of the variables. Larger values of this indicator represent more 
heterogeneity in public opinion. 
10 This is question 29.6 in Eurobarometer survey 61.0. 
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Graph 2: Heterogeneity of Public Opinion and national salience, by country 
 

































Sources: Eurobarometer 61.0 and own calculations based on content analysis of party manifestos 
 
 
Explaining a Party’s Position on the Constitution 
 
Is there a relationship between the ideological stance of a party and its position on the 
Constitution (Hypothesis 3)? Using descriptive measures, table (2) shows that there is 
such a relationship.11 We find that the left/right stance is related to the position a party 
takes on the Constitution.12 Radical parties, particularly on the right but also on the left, 
have a negative attitude toward the Constitution. Parties of the centre are most likely to 
have a positive position on the Constitution. Table (2) shows that this relationship is 
statistically significant. Disaggregating by party family, the same pattern emerges: 
radical party families Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) and Greens take a 
distinctly negative position on the Constitution; party families European United 
Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL) and Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) have 
relatively low mean scores; while centre party families the Party of European Socialists 
(PES), the European Liberal Democratic and Reform Party (ELDR) and the European 
People’s Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) take by far the most positive position 




                                                 
11 Although we have collected 100 party manifestos we do not use all of them in this table. The 
difference stems from the fact that the expert data set from Chapel Hill and Benoit and Laver does not 
include all of these 100 parties. 
12 The definition of left/right corresponds to the data from the Chapel Hill expert survey. Values of 1 
through 3 correspond to left, values of 4 through 7 correspond to centre, and values of 8 through 10 
correspond to right. 
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Table 2: Determinants of Party Position on the Constitution 
 




 Mean SD  
Left/Right Left 2.11 4.51 31 
 Centre 5.10 5.81 28 
 Right 0.79 3.73 28 
 Eta2         
0.13*** 
  
 F         6.05   
Party Family EUL/NGL 2.64 2.87 18 
 PES 3.52 6.20 13 
 Greens/EFA -0.90 4.18 13 
 ELDR 3.45 3.96 14 
 EPP-ED 6.68 5.83 11 
 UEN 2.28 5.26 14 
 EDD -1.27 3.36 4 
 Eta2         
0.28*** 
  
 F         5.26   
Dissent United 2.64 5.04 30 
 Minor dissent 1.85 4.70 29 
 Divided 4.90 7 11 
 Eta2         0.04  
 F         1.35  
Position Opposed -2.25 4.07 15 
 Neutral -0.43 4.01 8 
 In Favour 4.77 4.49 47 
 Eta2         0.34***  
 F         17.05  
Insider/Outsider Outsider -0.14 4.41 24 
 Insider 4.13 5.13 46 
 Eta2         0.15***  
 F         12.03  
 
Significance: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.10 
 
 
Concerning the relationship between how divided a party is over European integration 
and its position on the Constitution (Hypothesis 4) we find that parties that are united 
are quite similar in their position on the Constitution compared to parties that have 
only minor dissent. The average scores are 2.64 and 1.85 respectively. Furthermore, 
counterintuitive to Hypothesis 4, parties that are divided have a positive attitude 
towards the Constitution, albeit with a large standard deviation. The respective scores 
are 4.9 and 7. This indicates that Hypothesis 4, which states that the greater a party’s 
internal division over European integration the less likely that it will be in favour of the 
Constitution, cannot be confirmed. 
 
Concerning the question whether a party’s overall position on European integration is 
related to its position on the Constitution (Hypothesis 5), table (2) indicates that such a 
relationship does exist. Parties opposed to European integration have distinctly 
negative mean scores (-2.25) compared to parties that are neutral (-0.43) or in favour 
(4.77). These descriptive measures confirm Hypothesis 5. We hypothesised that the 
more a party takes a positive position on European integration the more it will take a 
37                                                                                                                          I JCER Volume 5 • Issue 1                                                                                                 
 
positive position on the Constitution. A party’s general inclination towards the EU does 
appear to be related to its general attitude towards the European Constitution.  
 
Finally, we turn to the question whether a party’s participation or non-participation in 
the Constitutional Convention is related to its position on the Constitution (Hypothesis 
6). Table (2) clearly indicates that participants in the Constitutional Convention – 
insiders – were by far more positive about the Constitution than non-participants – the 
outsiders.13 This confirms our hypothesis that participating in the Constitutional 
Convention coincides with a more positive position on the Constitution. 
 
Concerning which factors indicate what position a party is likely to take on the 
Constitution, the descriptive analysis and measures of association so far indicate that 
among the variables tested only the left/right ideological stance, the overall position 
on European integration, and the insider/outsider status of a party have an impact. We 
now use multiple regression analysis to determine the relative impact of each factor 
when the other predictor variables are held constant. The results are shown in table (3). 
We find that the strongest predictor of party position is its overall position on European 
integration (with a coefficient of 0.46) followed by a party’s insider/outsider status (with 
a coefficient of 0.22). Both of these variables are significant at the p< 0.001 level. Also 
significant is a party’s left/right stance. 
 
 
Table 3: Multiple Regression Analysis for Position on Constitution 
 
Standardised coefficients  
(t-values) 
 Position on 
Constitution 
Left/Right                -0.20 * 
      (-1.95) 
Dissent  0.05 
       (0.43) 
Position  0.46***  
       (3.91) 
Insider/Outsider         0.22*** 




    0.34 
    8.50 
    70 
 
 
Significance: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.10 
 
 
Is there a relationship between the salience a party assigns to the Constitution and the 
position this party takes on the Constitution, for example, are parties assigning high 
salience to the Constitution also more likely to be in favour of it? Graph (3) shows a 
number of counter examples to this assertion, that is, the parties along the downward 
sloping line. These parties assign high salience to the Constitution and take a negative 
position on it. Beyond this insight, the graph also contains some additional information. 
Round markers signify that a party participated in the Constitutional Convention. 
Triangle markers indicate that a party did not participate in the Convention. The size of 
both markers is proportional to a party’s share of the vote in the 2004 EP elections.  
 
 
                                                 
13  Participation could have been either as a representative of government, national Parliament or the 
European Parliament, and either as full member or alternate. 
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Source: Own calculations based on content analysis of party manifestos 
 
 
Graph 3 shows that almost all of the parties situated on the downward slope are parties 
that did not participate in the Constitutional Convention. We find only three 
exceptions: the Swedish Vänsterpartiet, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale and the British 
Conservative Party. These three parties participated in the Convention and yet were 
markedly negative about the Constitution in their manifestos. The upward slope 
contains some parties that did not participate in the Convention, but is otherwise 
dominated by participants. Given the strong correlation between a party’s 
insider/outsider status and its position on the Constitution, one can expect to find that 
the 2004 EP elections was only one front of a larger battlefield. The results of the 
referenda on the Constitution in France and the Netherlands (May/June 2005) were 
perhaps the first indications of the ability of the euroskeptic quarters to mobilise 
against the EU. Whereas insiders had dominated the discussions about the Constitution 
at the Constitutional Convention, and on the whole received more votes in the 2004 EP 
elections, outsiders might have dominated the discussions about the Constitution and 





One recent concern in the political science literature is how European integration 
affects party competition. This paper contributes to the debate by considering the 
positions on the EU Constitution taken by parties during the 2004 EP elections. 
Through content analysis of party manifestos of national parties, we examined salience 
(the number of sentences devoted to the Constitution) and direction (whether for or 
against the Constitution). 
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Assessing what salience parties assigned to and their position on the Constitution 
during the 2004 EP elections contributes to discussions about the nature of EP 
elections. However, the extent to which national parties actually do discuss the 
Constitution can indicate more how strategically useful they think it is to address 
European issues during an election campaign. Examination of systemic salience shows 
that, rather than viewing EP elections as being either second-order elections, with 
European issues playing second fiddle to national issues, or European elections 
representing real transnational policy choices, it is more insightful to examine how far 
national parties vary in their strategic use of a European issue during election 
campaigns. This finding adds an important element to the salience theory that we 
discussed earlier, namely, that the salience of European issues is not simply related to 
issue ownership by particular parties, but results from the interaction of parties within a 
national party system. 
 
Additionally, we have found a statistically significant relationship between 
heterogeneity of public opinion and the salience parties assign to the Constitution. 
Heterogeneity of public opinion is a fair predictor of the salience parties in a given 
country assign to the Constitution.  
 
Concerning additional predictor variables for party position on the Constitution, we 
find that the strongest predictor is a party’s insider/outsider status at the Constitutional 
Convention, followed by a party’s overall position on European integration, and, finally, 
its left/right ideological stance. This pattern shows that in addition to the central 
proposition of cleavage theory that ideology matters (i.e. left/right), there are also 
important additional factors that matter and influence a party’s position on the 
Constitution. 
 
There is increasing evidence that national parties, while using EP elections to position 
themselves in the national arena, cannot insulate themselves fully from the issues 
discussed at the EU level (Ray 1999; Marks et al. 2002; Arnold and Pennings 2005). 
Instead, during election campaigns, parties can strategically exploit European issues as 
a means to differentiate themselves from perceived competitors. In line with the 
experience of the constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands, this article 
presents empirical evidence that Constitutional Convention insiders defined the 
political space in favour of the Constitution during the 2004 EP elections. Convention 
‘outsiders’ used the 2004 EP elections as a platform to oppose the Constitution and as a 
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